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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act (DTVIA)
t J.D. Yale Law School, expected 2013. The author wishes to thank Professor Eugene Fidell
for his help with this Note.
1. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2285 (West 2011).
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in 2008 to address a new tool employed by drug traffickers to transport illicit
drugs worldwide: the self-propelled submersible vessel (SPSS). According to
one congressman, at any particular moment more than one hundred of these
vessels are destined for the United States, and each can carry large amounts of
drugs. 2 One SPSS vessel intercepted by the Coast Guard, for example,
contained seven tons of cocaine, worth $187 million.3 SPSS vessels pose new
problems for law enforcement. They are both difficult for the Coast Guard to
detect and easy for crewmembers, who often prefer losing their cargo to being
caught, to sink. At the first sign of the Coast Guard, drug traffickers can
quickly sink the vessel and jump into the ocean, which destroys the evidence
necessary to prosecute them for a drug offense and forces the Coast Guard to
undertake rescue operations.
The DTVIA responds to these practical difficulties by criminalizing the
operation of a submersible or semi-submersible vessel without nationality and
with the intent to evade detection.4 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, the only Circuit to have heard a challenge to the DTVIA as of April 1,
2012, has treated the law as an extension of its predecessors,5 the Marijuana on
the High Seas Act (MHSA) 6 and the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
(MDLEA). The previous laws made it criminal for individuals to possess
drugs with the intent to distribute while on board a "vessel subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States," which was defined to include vessels without
nationality. 8 Courts upheld these earlier laws on the theory that, under
customary and treaty international law, all states can exercise jurisdiction over
stateless vessels on the high seas solely because of their status as stateless.9
2. 154 CONG. REc. H10253 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Rep. Ted Poe). Drug
submarines first came into use in the late 1990s, but at that time were considered rare. Waving, Not
Drowning: Cocaine Now Moves by Submarine, ECONOMIST (London), May 1, 2008,
http://www.economist.com/node/ll294435 [hereinafter Waving, Not Drowning]. Now, however, they
are posing major challenges to law enforcement. These submarines, which can be made for as little as
$500,000 each and assembled in fewer than three months, are thought to carry almost thirty percent of
Colombia's cocaine exports. David Kushner, Drug-Sub Culture, N.Y. TIMES, April 23, 2009, at MM30,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/26/magazine/26drugs-t.html. They are generally made of
fiberglass and wood and have four-person crews. They can carry two to five tons of cocaine at any one
time, and have a range of about 2,000 miles. Waving, Not Drowning, supra. Because they can so easily
evade radar systems, only an estimated fifteen percent are discovered. Id. Cargoes can be worth more
than $100 million. William Booth & Juan Forero, Semi-Submarines Stealthily Plying Pacific, Arrive as
a Way To Smuggle Cocaine, WASH. POST, June 6, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/06/05/AR2009060503718.html. For more information on drug submarines, see
Douglas A. Kash & Eli White, A New Law Counters the Semisubmersible Smuggling Threat, FBI LAW
ENFORCEMENT BULL., Mar. 2010, at 26; and Chris Kraul, Drug Traffickers Use Submersibles to Ferry
Narcotics: Some in U.S. Fear the Tactic May Inspire Terrorists, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2007,
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-narcosub6nov06,0,6804696.story.
3. 154 CONG. REc. H 10252 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Rep. Smith).
4. A ship must have also travelled outside of any one country's territorial sea. Pub. L. No.
110-407, 122 Stat. 4296 (2008) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2285(a)).
5. See discussion infra Part III.
6. Marijuana on the High Seas Act, Pub. L. No. 96-350, 94 Stat. 1159 (1980).
7. 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501-07 (2006). In 2006, Congress repealed the MDLEA as codified at 46
U.S.C. app. §§ 1901-1904 (2002) and re-codified it in Title 46 itself. The new form maintains the same
policies and much of the same wording as the old form. This Note will use the new form.
8. See discussion infra Part Ill.
9. See discussion infra Part Ill.
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The Eleventh Circuit, however, seemed not to realize that stateless vessels
played a different role under the DTVIA than they had had in the MHSA and
MDLEA.10 Unlike these laws, the DTVIA does not use a vessel's statelessness
solely as a jurisdictional hook. Instead, the DTVIA makes the operation of a
stateless vessel a key component of the substantive crime it proscribes.
This Note argues that the DTVIA's dual treatment of stateless vessels
blurs the distinction between claiming jurisdiction over stateless vessels
because they are stateless and treating the operation of a vessel without
nationality as a universal crime. While customary and treaty international law
may authorize the former, it does not, and should not, authorize the latter. The
use of vessels without nationality does not pose the same threat to the
international community as currently recognized universal crimes.
Furthermore, making the operation of a stateless vessel a universal crime would
affect other areas of international law, like refugee law, in significant and
troubling ways.
This Note has eight Parts. Part II briefly introduces the relevant
jurisdictional principles of international law. It explores both the five general
jurisdictional theories that authorize the exercise of prescriptive criminal
jurisdiction and the more specific jurisdictional regime, the law of the flag,
which governs the law of the sea. Part III gives an overview of the evolution of
U.S. maritime drug laws, paying particular attention to the MDLEA and the
MHSA, and examines how U.S. courts have dealt with the MDLEA's
authorization of the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction over stateless vessels. Part IV
argues that the DTVIA differs from the MDLEA by making the operation of a
stateless vessel a key element of the crime, in addition to using a vessel's
statelessness as a jurisdictional hook. Consequently, I argue, the DTVIA has
blurred the line between using a vessel's status as stateless as a jurisdictional
provision and treating the conduct of operating a stateless vessel as if it were a
universal crime.
In Parts V and VI, I argue that the operation of a stateless vessel is not,
and should not be, a universal crime. Vessels without nationality do not cause
the same level or type of harm as crimes currently recognized as subject to
universal jurisdiction, and making the use of a stateless vessel a universal crime
would have problematic interactions with other areas of international law, like
refugee law. In Part VII, I demonstrate why scholars, courts, and legislators
should be concerned that states will treat the operation of a stateless vessel as if
it were a universal crime, potentially paving the way for unfortunate changes to
customary international law. Part VIII offers conclusions.
II. JURISDICTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: FIVE GENERAL
PRINCIPLES AND THE LAW OF THE FLAG
There are five general doctrines authorizing the exercise of jurisdiction
under international law." With the exception of universal jurisdiction, all of
10. See discussion infra Part 111.
11. The five principles are the nationality principle, the territoriality principle, the protective
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them require a nexus between a state and the conduct it seeks to proscribe. In
addition to this general jurisdictional system, a more specific regime governs
the law of the sea, known as the law of the flag. Under the law of the flag,
states have exclusive jurisdiction, subject to some notable limitations, over their
ships on the high seas.
A. Criminal Jurisdiction Under International Law
International law distinguishes among prescriptive jurisdiction, the
authority to apply a law to particular conduct or individuals; enforcement
jurisdiction, the authority to compel compliance with the law; and adjudicative
jurisdiction, the authority to subject an individual to a state's judicial system.12
This Note will focus largely on prescriptive jurisdiction.' 3
States can exercise prescriptive jurisdiction under international law if they
satisfy the requirements of one of five accepted doctrines, each of which will be
discussed in turn: (1) the nationality principle, (2) the territoriality (or
territorial) principle, (3) the protective principle, (4) the passive personality
principle, and (5) the universality principle.14 The first four of these principles
require a connection between the state and the conduct that it wishes to
proscribe. The nationality principle grants states jurisdiction over their own
nationals.' 5 The territoriality principle gives states jurisdiction over actions
committed inside of their boundaries. It also allows states to reach conduct
occurring outside of their borders if that conduct has substantial effects within
their territory.' 6 The protective principle grants states jurisdiction over offenses
directed against the "security of the state or . . . threatening the integrity of
government functions .. " The passive personality principle, which not all
states have recognized, 18 authorizes states to exercise extraterritorial
principle, the passive personality principle, and the universality principle. These principles were first
discussed in Harvard Research in Int'l Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435,
445 (Supp. 1935), and have largely been followed, in whole or in part, by subsequent scholars and
commentators. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmts. a-g (1987);
MARIA GAVOUNELI, FUNCTIONAL JURISDICTION IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 29-30 (2007); cf Geoffrey R.
Watson, The Passive Personality Principle, 28 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (1993) (noting that many states,
including the United States, have historically opposed the passive personality principle). These
principles will be discussed in greater depth infra Section II.A.
12. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401 (1987).
13. Note that jurisdiction refers only to the authority to proscribe, enforce, or adjudicate a
particular rule; it does not refer to the substance of the rule itself, although the substance of a rule and
jurisdiction may be intertwined, such as in cases of universal jurisdiction.
14. Charles R. Fritch, Drug Smuggling on the High Seas: Using International Legal Principles
To Establish Jurisdiction Over the Illicit Narcotics Trade and the Ninth Circuit's Unnecessary Nexus
Requirement, 8 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REv. 701, 712 (2009).
15. See, e.g., Christopher L. Blakesley & Dan E. Stigall, The Myopia of U.S. v. Martinelli:
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the 21st Century, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 1, 13 (2007); Fritch,
supra note 14, at 712.
16. See, e.g., Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 15, at 14-15. Some scholars refer to this type of
jurisdiction as the "objective territorial principle" or the "objective principle." See, e.g., Stephanie M.
Chaissan, "Minimum Contacts" Abroad: Using the International Shoe Test To Restrict the
Extraterritorial Exercise of United States Jurisdiction Under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act,
38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 641 (2007).
17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. f(1987).
18. See Watson, supra note 11, at 2 (noting that many states, including the United States, have
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jurisdiction over acts against their nationals.' 9
Lastly, and most importantly for this Note, the universality principle
gives states the power to punish "certain offenses recognized by the community
of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, . . . genocide, war crimes,
and perhaps certain acts of terrorism, even where none of the bases for
jurisdiction . . . is present .... In other words, crimes become "universal"
because the international community recognizes them as such. That recognition
grants states jurisdiction over the conduct recognized as a universal crime,
regardless of whether the perpetrator, victim, or action has any relation to that
state.21
The universality principle is therefore different from the other four types
of prescriptive jurisdiction in two key ways. First, it does not require any
connection between the state and the conduct at issue. 22 Second, the
universality principle collapses the distinctions, discussed in the opening
paragraph of this Section, among enforcement, adjudicatory, and prescriptive
jurisdiction. While the first four principles provide only prescriptive
jurisdiction, under the universality principle, the substance of the act itself both
allows, and in some circumstances may even require, states to take judicial
action against the perpetrator. 23 As one scholar has argued:
[A] distinctive symbiosis exists between universal prescriptive jurisdiction (the
international legal prohibition on the crime) and universal adjudicative
jurisdiction (the judicial competence of all states to apply that prohibition to
perpetrators of the crime). The prescriptive substance of universal jurisdiction
both authorizes and circumscribes universal adjudicative jurisdiction. That is to
say, the prescriptive substance defines not only the universal crimes
themselves, but also the judicial competence of all courts wishing to exercise
universal jurisdiction.2 4
historically opposed the passive personality principle); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. g (1987) (stating that the passive personality principle "has not been
generally accepted" for ordinary crimes).
19. See, e.g., Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 15. For a good discussion of the evolution of the
passive personality principle, see GAVOUNELI, supra note 11.
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987).
21. See, e.g., PRINCETON UNIV. PROGRAM IN LAW & PUB. AFFAIRS, THE PRINCETON
PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 28 (2001) [hereinafter PRINCETON PRINCIPLES], available at
http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/unive jur.pdf.
22. See, e.g., id.; M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes:
Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 88 (2001).
23. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, The History of Universal Jurisdiction and Its Place in
International Law, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF
SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 39, 42-43 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004). Some scholars
have argued that if universal jurisdiction is established by treaty, states can still exercise universal
jurisdiction over the nationals of states who are not parties to the treaty. See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf,
Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of Non-Party States, 35 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 363 (2001). This view has some support under the "Lotus Principle," arising out of a 1927 case of
the Permanent Court of International Justice, which stated that "[riestrictions upon the independence of
States cannot . .. be presumed." S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7).
Instead, states have "a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive
rules." Id. at 19.
24. Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism
and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 121, 130-31 (2007).
However, there may still be some limits on a state's ability to exercise enforcement jurisdiction under
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While nearly all scholars of international law acknowledge the existence
of a universality principle, some have also noted that the "content [and] scope"
of that principle is unclear.2 5 The universality principle is an "exceptional
international jurisdictional doctrine" because it "holds that the very commission
of certain 'universal crimes' engenders jurisdiction for all states irrespective of
where the crime occurred or which state's nationals were involved." 26 For
instance, the Princeton Principles of Universal Jurisdiction define the
universality principle as "criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the
crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the
alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other
connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction." 2 7 Alternatively, one
commentator defines universal jurisdiction as "the principle that certain crimes
are so heinous, and so universally recognized and abhorred, that a state is
entitled or even obliged to undertake legal proceedings without regard to where
the crime was committed or the nationality of the perpetrators or the victims."28
Although universal jurisdiction is "not widely understood," 29 these
commentators make two things clear. The first is that universal jurisdiction
allows a state to prosecute individuals for conduct that has no relation to that
state. The second is that the nature of the offense itself grants this jurisdiction-
no separate basis for prescriptive jurisdiction need be present.
B. Law of the Flag
In addition to this general regime, the international community depends
upon a specialized jurisdictional system to maintain public order on the high
seas: the law of the flag.30 Under the law of the flag, a ship has the nationality
of the country whose flag it is entitled to fly.31 This country is often referred to
as the flag state. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and
customary international law provide that, with a few notable exceptions, the
flag state has exclusive jurisdiction over its vessels on the high seas. 32
the universality principle that do not apply to prescriptive jurisdiction. For example, "when a state relies
upon universal jurisdiction for its power to enforce, a state necessarily has to be subject to certain
international legal obligations, such as procedural immunity for heads of state and diplomats .
Bassiouni, supra note 22, at 87.
25. See, e.g., LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 28 (2003).
26. Colangelo, supra note 24, at 130.
27. PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 21, at 28.
28. Stephen Macedo, Introduction, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE
PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 23, at 1, 4.
29. Id
30. See R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 257 (3d ed. 1999).
31. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 91, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. Although several maritime nations, including the United States, have not
ratified UNCLOS, many of its provisions are treated as customary international law. See, e.g., United
States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 588 n.10 (1992); Michael G. Chalos & Wayne A. Parker, The
Criminalization of Maritime Accidents and Marpol Violations in the United States, 23 U.S.F. MAR. L.J.
206, 236 n.135 (2011); John A. Duff, The United States and the Law of the Sea Convention: Sliding
Back from Accession and Ratification, 11 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 1, 10 (2006); Harold Hongju Koh, Is
International Law Really State Law?, Ill HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1836 n.64 (1998).
32. UNCLOS, supra note 31, art. 92(1). This provision of UNCLOS codifies customary
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Furthermore, under customary and treaty international law, only the flag state
can exercise diplomatic protection on a vessel's behalf.33 Individuals have no
standing to contest a vessel's treatment because the freedom of navigation, on
which the law of the sea is premised, belongs to states, not individuals. 34
In addition to these rights, the flag state has several responsibilities,
including the responsibility to ensure that its ships comply with domestic and
international law and regulations. Article 94 of UNCLOS lays out the basic
duties of the flag state. 35 Most notably, a state must exercise "jurisdiction and
control [over its fleet] in administrative, technical, and social matters." 3 6
Control includes ensuring that ships are seaworthy and comply with relevant
labor regulations and criminal laws. 37 Furthermore, "[n]ationality also
indicates which State is responsible in international law for the vessel in cases
where an act or omission of the vessel is attributable to the State."38
Each state generally has complete discretion to determine the criteria by
which ships become entitled to carry its nationality. There has been growing
international pressure to require states to have a "genuine link," as codified in
Article 91 of UNCLOS, with their fleet.39 However, practically speaking,
many states do not require such a link. 40 The lack of a genuine-link
requirement has led to the rise of "flags of convenience," where ships register
with states with which they have no real connection because the state is known
to have low fees and few enforcement mechanisms.41
In addition to ships flying flags of convenience, some ships have no
nationality at all. Ships without nationality, also called stateless, flagless, or
unregistered vessels, undermine the law-of-the-flag regime. Because stateless
vessels do not have a flag state, no state can exercise control over them on the
international law. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 25 (Sept. 7) ("In virtue
of the principle of the freedom of the seas ... no State may exercise any kind ofjurisdiction over foreign
vessels upon them."); Neil Brown, Jurisdictional Problems Relating to Non-Flag State Boarding of
Suspect Ships in International Waters: A Practitioner's Observations, in SELECTED CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 69, 70 (Clive R. Symmons ed., 2011). This exclusive jurisdiction is
subject to a number of limitations, including the right of visit contained in UNCLOS Article 110. A flag
state's exclusive control is further limited in the exclusive economic zone and the contiguous zone of
other states, and is at its most limited in another state's territorial sea. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note
30, at 263.
33. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 30, at 257; see also Molvan v. Attorney Gen. for
Palestine (The "Asya"), [1948] A.C. 351, 369-70 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Palestine) (noting that no
state can assert diplomatic protection over a stateless vessel because there is no flag state). Note that this
discussion focuses solely on the law of the flag. The country whose citizens are on board the vessel may
also be able to assert its rights.
34. See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 31, art. 87 ("The high seas are open to all States ....
These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their
exercise of the freedom of the high seas . . . .").
35. UNCLOS, supra note 31, art. 94.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 30, at 257.
39. UNCLOS, supra note 31, art. 91.
40. See, e.g., H. Edwin Anderson, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience:
Economics, Politics and Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 139, 150-57 (1996); Deirdre M. Warner-
Kramer & Krista Canty, Stateless Fishing Vessels: The Current International Regime and a New
Approach, 5 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 227, 230 (2000).
41. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 30, at 257-62; Anderson, supra note 40, at 150-57.
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high seas or provide diplomatic protection on their behalf.42 Ships can become
stateless in a variety of ways. They may lose their nationality if they violate
their flag state's laws or do not comply with its requirements; their flag state
may be unrecognized by the international community; or they may never
register with any state.43 Furthermore, ships that sail under more than one flag,
using one or the other according to convenience, are "assimilated" to stateless
ships under UNCLOS." Because stateless ships do not enjoy the protection of
any state, some countries and scholars have asserted that any state can assert
jurisdiction over them.45 But, as discussed infra, a ship's statelessness alone
46may not authorize such actions.
III. EVOLUTION OF THE UNITED STATES'S MARITIME DRUG LAWS: THE
MHSA AND MDLEA
The law of the flag has proven ill-suited to combating the international
drug trade. The ships used to transport drugs are often unregistered, allowing
them to effectively operate outside of any state's control.4 7 Furthermore, drug
traffickers have adopted strategies that exploit the freedom of the high seas;
they remain on the high seas for as long as possible, only entering a state's
territorial waters using small, fast boats that are difficult to detect and
apprehend.48 To address these gaps, the United States has passed a series of
drug laws expanding U.S. jurisdiction to cover drug trafficking occurring on
the high seas anywhere in the world. The first two of these laws, the Marijuana
on the High Seas Act (MHSA) 49 and the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
(MDLEA),so treat a ship's statelessness as a sixth basis for prescriptive
jurisdiction. This Part will first discuss the enactment of the MHSA and the
MDLEA and then analyze U.S. courts' treatment of the MDLEA's
jurisdictional provisions.
A. The Enactment of the MSA and the MDLEA
The international drug trade is one of the most profitable industries in the
42. See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 31, art. 92 ("Ships shall sail under the flag of one State
only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in this Convention,
shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas."); see also supra note 33 and
accompanying text.
43. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 30, at 213-14.
44. UNCLOS, supra note 31, art. 92.
45. See discussion infra Part V.
46. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 30, at 214.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Matos-Luchi, 627 F.3d I (1st Cir. 2010); United States v.
Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Alvarez-Mena, 765 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir.
1985); William C. Gilmore, Narcotics Interdiction at Sea: UK-US Cooperation, 13 MARINE POL'Y, 218,
228 (1989).
48. This is an example of the so-called "mothership" strategy. For a discussion of the
mothership strategy, see Charles Leonard-Christopher Vaccaro, Bringing in the Mother Lode: The
Second Circuit Rides in the Wake of Marino-Garcia-United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 10 MAR. LAW. 141,
145 (1985).
49. Marijuana on the High Seas Act, Pub. L. No. 96-350, 94 Stat. 1159 (1980).
50. Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. § 705 (2006).
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world, generating an estimated $400 billion annually.5' The United States is
the world's largest market for these drugs, and it spends more than $8 billion
per year to combat maritime drug trafficking worldwide.52 In 2007 alone, for
example, the Coast Guard seized thirty-seven ships, which contained a
combined total of 166,983 kilograms of drugs.
Congress passed the MHSA in 1980 following a dramatic increase in
drug trafficking in the 1970s.54 The Act was designed to combat the then-
prominent use of the "mothership" strategy of transporting drugs into the
United States.s Under this strategy, foreign-flagged motherships wait just
outside of U.S. jurisdiction and use smaller, often unregistered, vessels, to
transport drugs to shore.56 These vessels are extremely difficult to detect and
capture because they are small and often fast-moving. 57 Prior to the MHSA,
even when U.S. authorities apprehended the smaller vessels, law enforcement
agents struggled to prove that the motherships had conspired with the smaller
ships to import drugs into the United States.58 To solve this problem, the
MHSA made it illegal "for any person on board a vessel of the United States, or
on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States on the high
seas, to knowingly or intentionally manufacture or distribute, or to possess with
intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance."59 Under the
MHSA, the government did not need to prove that any drugs the Coast Guard
discovered were bound for the United States. Law enforcement agents had to
demonstrate only that the vessel was subject to U.S. jurisdiction and on the
high seas.
The MHSA also expanded the ambit of U.S. jurisdiction by declaring that
stateless vessels are "vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."60
By its terms, therefore, the Act applied to the possession of drugs on the high
seas all around the world, and if the vessel was stateless, then no connection
between the ship and the United States was necessary. Stateless vessels, as
defined in the Act, included vessels flying no flag and vessels bearing
fraudulent or multiple registries.6 1
By the mid-1980s, the MHSA had become insufficient. Not only was the
Act difficult to enforce-often because law enforcement officers found proving
that a vessel was stateless under the Act's definition to be challenging and
51. Fritch, supra note 14, at 701.
52. Id.
53. John O'Neil Sheehy, Note, False Perceptions of Limitation: Why Imposing a Nexus
Requirement Under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act Would Not Significantly Discourage
Efforts To Prosecute Maritime Drug Trafficking, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1677, 1690 (2011) (citing Office of
Law Enforcement, Coast Guard Drug Removal Statistics, U.S. COAST GUARD, Oct. 19, 2011,
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/Drugs/stats.asp.
54. Eugene Kontorovich, Beyond the Article I Horizon: Congress's Enumerated Powers and
Universal Jurisdiction over Drug Crimes, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1191, 1197 (2009).




59. Marijuana on the High Seas Act, Pub. L. No. 96-350, § 1, 94 Stat. 1159 (1980).
60. Id. § 2.
61. Id.
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time-consuming-but the new prevalence of cocaine made the law appear too
weak because possessing drugs on the high seas, in and of itself, was not a
crime.62 In 1986, Congress passed the MDLEA.63 The MDLEA expanded the
MHSA's jurisdictional provisions. While the MHSA applied only to vessels
with some connection to the United States and stateless vessels,' the MDLEA
applies also to foreign ships with foreign crews as long as the flag state
consents.65 Furthermore, the MDLEA lowers the government's burden in
proving that vessels are stateless. Rather than requiring the U.S. government to
obtain proof of statelessness sufficient to withstand scrutiny in court, which
could take several months,66 the Act broadens the definition of statelessness to
include vessels that do not produce evidence of registry upon request and those
whose asserted flag state does not "affirmatively and unequivocally" confirm
their registration. 67
B. Challenges to the MDLEA: A Vessel's Statelessness as a New Basis
for Jurisdiction
Soon after the law went into effect, individuals facing criminal
prosecution under the MDLEA began challenging its jurisdictional provisions
on due process grounds. In upholding the MDLEA, some courts invoked
international law, reasoning that international law is "useful as a rough guide"
in determining whether application of the statute violates due process.68
Specifically, they held that the law satisfies the protective principle, because
drugs threaten the integrity of the United States, 69 the universality principle,
because drug smuggling is a universal crime,70 and the territoriality principle,
because drug trafficking outside of the United States has effects within U.S.
borders.71 The Ninth Circuit cabins the MDLEA's jurisdictional provisions
62. Kontorovich, supra note 54, at 1198-99.
63. Pub. L. No. 109-304; 120 Stat. 1488.
64. Marijuana on the High Seas Act, Pub. L. No. 96-350, § 2, 94 Stat. 1159 (1980).
65. Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503-07 (2006).
66. S. REP. No. 95-797, at 15 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5986, 6000-01.
67. 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C). This definition of stateless vessels, and the definitions
contained in the Act's successors, differs from that contained in UNCLOS, which states that ships have
the nationality of the country whose flag they are entitled to fly. UNCLOS, supra note 31, art. 92. While
this may itself be contrary to customary and treaty international law, the differences between the
definition of vessels without nationality under U.S. law and under UNCLOS are not the subject of this
Note.
68. United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1995); cf United States v. Cardales,
168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. 1999) ("In determining whether due process is satisfied, we are guided by
principles of international law.").
69. See, e.g., United States v. Sinisterra, No. 06-15824, 2007 WL 1695698, at *3 (11th Cir.
2007) ('Congress, under the 'protective principle' of international law, may assert extraterritorial
jurisdiction over vessels in the high seas that are engaged in conduct that has a potentially adverse effect
and is generally recognized as a crime by nations that have reasonably developed legal systems."'
(quoting United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1108 (2002))); United States v. Bravo, 489 F.3d 1, 7
(1st Cir. 2007) ("The extra-territorial jurisdiction authorized in the MDLEA is consistent with the
'protective principle' of international law . ); United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11 th
Cir. 2003) (same).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Salcedo-Ibarra, 2009 WL 1953399 (M.D. Fla. July 6, 2009).
71. See, e.g., Cardales, 168 F.3d at 553; United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 370 (5th Cir.
2002) (citing Cardales with approval). Note that all three of these justifications are likely incorrect if the
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somewhat by requiring a "sufficient nexus" between the drugs or the drug
traffickers and the United States if the traffickers are traveling in a vessel with
nationality.72 Nonetheless, the other circuits have largely disagreed.n
Furthermore, U.S. courts have almost uniformly held that stateless vessels
are entitled to even less protection under international law, and therefore the
Due Process Clause, than foreign-flagged vessels boarded with the flag state's
consent. Even the Ninth Circuit, the only circuit that normally requires a nexus
between the drug traffickers being hauled into court and the United States, has
found that a nexus is unnecessary to prosecute the crews of vessels without
nationality. Statelessness alone is sufficient to establish U.S. jurisdiction. In
United States v. Caicedo, for example, the Ninth Circuit, quoting the Eleventh
Circuit, found that "international law 'restrictions on the right to assert
jurisdiction over foreign vessels on the high seas and the concomitant
exceptions have no applicability in connection with stateless vessels"' 74
because "by attempting to shrug the yoke of any nation's authority, they subject
themselves to the jurisdiction of all nations 'solely as a consequence of the
vessel's status as stateless."' 75 Thus, according to the Ninth Circuit,
statelessness provides a sixth basis, in addition to the five general jurisdictional
principles discussed supra, on which states can base prescriptive jurisdiction.
Treating ships' statelessness as an additional basis for prescriptive
jurisdiction is controversial, but it is not wholly without support in customary
and treaty international law. Several states have found that all nations can stand
in for the missing flag state when dealing with vessels without nationality. In
determining that stateless vessels are subject to all states' jurisdiction, for
example, the Eleventh Circuit 76 cited an English case, Molvan v. Attorney-
General for Palestine.7 7 According to Molvan:
[T]he freedom of the open sea, whatever those words may connote, is a
freedom of ships which fly, and are entitled to fly, the flag of a State which is
within the comity of nations. The Asya [a stateless ship] did not satisfy these
elementary conditions. No question of comity nor of any breach of international
law can arise if there is no State under whose flag the vessel sails. . . . [T]he
Asya could not claim the protection of any State nor could any State claim that
vessels at issue are not destined for the United States, particularly the assertion that drug trafficking is a
universal crime. See, e.g., GAVOUNELI, supra note i1, at 27-28 ("Interestingly enough and contrary to
popular belief, neither slavery and slave related practices nor drug trafficking are covered by universal
jurisdiction under the Law of the Sea Convention-or indeed other instruments. . .
72. See United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1990).
73. See, e.g., Rendon, 354 F.3d at 1325; Suerte, 291 F.3d at 376; United States v. Martinez-
Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1053 (3d Cir. 1993); Chaissan, supra note 16, at 643-44 ("While Ninth Circuit
cases such as United States v. Davis have required a nexus in order for a federal criminal statute to apply
extraterritorially consistent with the Due Process Clause, a significant number of cases have not made
such a requirement." (footnotes omitted)).
74. United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v.
Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1382 (1lth Cir. 1982)).
75. Id. (quoting Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d at 1383); see also United States v. Matos-Luchi, 627
F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2010) (arguing that international law treats statelessness as a basis for jurisdiction).
76. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d at 1382.
77. Molvan v. Attorney Gen. for Palestine (The "Asya"), [1948] A.C. 351 (P.C.) (appeal taken
from Palestine).
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any principle of international law was broken by her seizure.7 8
Under one possible interpretation of Molvan, stateless ships cannot
benefit from the freedom of the high seas because that freedom belongs only to
states, not to individual ships.79 Because ships without nationality are not free
to sail upon the high seas, according to this view, any state can assert
jurisdiction over them. Another possible interpretation of Molvan is that all
states can subject stateless vessels to their jurisdiction because only states can
protest a ship's treatment, not individuals.80 In the absence of a flag state, no
state or individual has standing to assert a ship's rights. Either way, Molvan
authorizes states to extend their jurisdiction to stateless vessels.
The United States is not alone in relying on the principles articulated in
Molvan to authorize the exercise of jurisdiction over vessels without
nationality. Rolf Einar Fife, when he was Director General of the Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Department of Legal Affairs, stated that Molvan's
holding that stateless vessels enjoy the protection of no state allows all states to
exercise jurisdiction over such vessels. 81 Consistent with this principle,
Norway's fisheries legislation applies equally to Norwegian ships, stateless
vessels, and vessels assimilated to stateless vessels.82
In light of these instances and others, several scholars have argued that
customary international law and treaty law allow all countries to exercise
jurisdiction over stateless ships. Andrew Anderson, for example, has asserted
that all nations must be allowed to exercise jurisdiction over stateless ships
because otherwise "an un-registered vessel would be immune from interference
by anyone. This result cannot be and has never been tolerated by the nations of
the world."83 Any other outcome, he argues, "would end in chaos and anarchy
on the high seas." 84 In Anderson's view, all states can therefore substitute for
the flag state when there is none.
86Other scholars, however, such as Churchill and Lowe, disagree. They
argue that to assert jurisdiction over a stateless vessel because it lacks
diplomatic protection would be to "ignore[] the possibility of diplomatic
78. Id at 369-70.
79. See Rachel Canty, Limits of Coast Guard Authority To Board Foreign Flag Vessels on the
High Seas, 23 TUL. MAR. L.J. 123, 126 (1998).
80. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 30, at 214.
81. Rolf Einar Fife, Elements of Nordic Practice 2006: Norwegian Measures Taken Against
Stateless Vessel Conducting Unauthorized Fishing on the High Seas, 76 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 301, 302
(2007); see also Efthymios Papastavridis, Interception of Human Beings on the High Seas: A
Contemporary Analysis Under International Law, 36 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 145, 160-61 (2009)
(discussing an Italian case that held that Italian authorities could arrest migrants on stateless vessels on
the high seas).
82. See Fife, supra note 81, at 302 (discussing the Salt Water Fisheries Act of June 3, 1983
(No. 40, § 1, 1 4(3))).
83. Andrew W. Anderson, Jurisdiction over Stateless Vessels on the High Seas: An Appraisal
Under Domestic and International Law, 13 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 323, 336 (1982); see also Eric M.
Komblau, United States v. Marino-Garcia: Criminal Jurisdiction over Stateless Vessels on the High
Seas, 9 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 141 (1983) (arguing that the Eleventh Circuit was correct in holding that
traditional limitations on jurisdiction under international law do not apply to stateless ships).
84. Anderson, supra note 83, at 336.
85. Id.
86. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 30, at 213-14.
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protection being exercised by the national State of the individuals on such
stateless ships."87 Churchill and Lowe maintain, therefore, that there must be
an independent jurisdictional nexus between the stateless ship and a state
before the state can extend its laws to the vessel.
IV. THE DTVIA: MIXING JURISDICTION AND SUBSTANCE
Like the MHSA before it, the MDLEA has proven inadequate to address
drug traffickers' changing strategies-specifically, the increased use of
submarines. Congress passed the DTVIA to address this deficiency. The
Eleventh Circuit has upheld the law as a new application of the jurisdictional
principles articulated in challenges to earlier drug laws, namely that a vessel's
status as stateless is sufficient to authorize the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction.89
However, this Part argues that the DTVIA differs from its predecessors because
it not only uses a vessel's statelessness as a basis for jurisdiction but also
includes the operation of a stateless vessel as a key component of the conduct
that it proscribes. I argue that the DTVIA has thereby blurred the line between
exercising jurisdiction based on a vessel's status as stateless and treating the
operation of a stateless vessel as if it were a universal crime.
A. The Passage of the DTVIA
Although courts have generally upheld the MDLEA's constitutionality,
the law has proven insufficient to combat drug traffickers' increasing use,
starting in the mid-1990s, of self-propelled semi-submersible and submersible
vessels (SPSS).90 These vessels can travel up to 2,000 miles91 at a speed of up
92to eight knots, and are much harder to detect than the boats that smugglers
had used previously.93 Furthermore, crewmembers often sink SPSS vessels at
the first sign of law enforcement. Prosecution for drug offenses, therefore, can
be extremely difficult, since most of the evidence of drugs is destroyed or lost
when the ship sinks.94
To aid prosecution, Congress passed the Drug Trafficking Vessel
Interdiction Act of 2008 (DTVIA).95 The DTVIA states that anyone who
''operates . . . or embarks in any submersible vessel or semi-submersible vessel
that is without nationality and that is navigating or has navigated into, through,
or from waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single country . .
with the intent to evade detection" has committed a crime against the United
87. Id at 214.
88. Id.
89. United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370 (11th Cir. 2011).
90. See 124 CONG. REC. H7237 (daily ed. July 29,2008).
91. Waving, Not Drowning, supra note 2.
92. Wade F. Wilkenson, A New Underwater Threat, PROCEEDINGS MAGAZINE, Oct. 14, 2008,
available at http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2008-10/new-underwater-threat.
93. Id.
94. See 124 CONG. REC. H7237 (daily ed. July 29, 2008) (statement of Rep. Daniel Lungren).
95. Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act, Pub. L. No. 110-407, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2285 (West
2011).
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States. Violations are punishable by up to fifteen years in prison, a fine, or
both.97 Under the Act, a valid claim of nationality is limited to:
(1) possession on board the vessel and production of documents evidencing the
vessel's nationality as provided in article 5 of the 1958 Convention on the High
Seas;
(2) flying [a] nation's ensign or flag; or
(3) a verbal claim of nationality or registry by the master or individual in charge
of the vessel.
Like the MDLEA, the DTVIA was soon challenged in court. The
Eleventh Circuit, the only court of appeals that has ruled on the Act's validity
thus far, upheld the DTVIA under the jurisdictional principles articulated in the
court's earlier cases affirming the validity of the MDLEA and its
predecessors. 99 In United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 100 the Eleventh
Circuit upheld the DTVIA without noting any significant difference between
the jurisdictional requirements of the DTVIA and of previous laws:
In the past we have held that the objective, protective, and territorial principles
"have no applicability in connection with stateless vessels" because such
vessels are "international pariahs" that have "no internationally recognized
right to navigate freely on the high seas." . . . We conclude, therefore, that
international law permits any nation to subject stateless vessels on the high seas
to its jurisdiction. . . . Jurisdiction exists solely as a consequence of the vessel's
status as stateless.' 0'
B. Combining Jurisdiction and Substance: Blurring the Lines
While the Eleventh Circuit understood the role of stateless vessels in the
DTVIA as continuous with that in previous statutes, the DTVIA's treatment of
stateless vessels is in fact significantly different from that in earlier laws. The
MDLEA and earlier statutes used a vessel's status as stateless as a basis for
prescriptive jurisdiction. Under the DTVIA, however, not only is a vessel's
statelessness grounds for the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction, it is also an
essential component of the conduct that the law criminalizes. This dual
treatment means the DTVIA no longer uses a vessel's statelessness solely as a
basis for the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction; it also begins to make the
operation of a stateless vessel look like a universal crime. As discussed below,
the universality principle (1) allows states to prosecute crimes to which they
96. Id. § 2285(a).
97. Id.
98. Id § 2285(d).
99. Those earlier cases include United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2003)
(discussing the MDLEA) and United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (1lth Cir. 1982)
(discussing a predecessor statute to the MDLEA).
100. 634 F.3d 1370 (llth Cir. 2011).
101. Id. at 1379 (quoting Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d at 1382). The 1lth Circuit also relied on an
MDLEA precedent, United States v. Estupinan, 453 F.3d 1336, 1338 (1lth Cir. 2006), in upholding the
DTVIA against a challenge under the High Seas Clause. United States v. Saac, 632 F.3d 1203, 1210-
1211 (11th Cir. 2011). Saac, however, was not decided on the basis of statelessness. Instead, the court
stated that drug trafficking is a universal crime and that the law was justified under the protective
principle. Id
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have no connection and (2) grants states jurisdiction over certain conduct based
solely on the nature of the offense. Laws that incorporate both of these
elements, and provide no additional basis for jurisdiction, treat the conduct they
proscribe as a universal crime.10 2 Because stateless vessels serve both as the
statute's only jurisdictional provision and as an element of the conduct that the
law proscribes, the DTVIA blurs the distinction between using a vessel's status
as statelessness purely as a jurisdictional hook, and treating the operation of a
stateless vessel as if it were a universal crime.
This stands in stark contrast to the MDLEA, which simply includes
statelessness as a basis for jurisdiction over a drug offense. The MDLEA
criminalizes drug possession, using statelessness as one among many possible
bases for the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction; statelessness is not an element of the
crime itself. In particular, the MDLEA includes stateless vessels in its
definition of ships "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" and
specifies that "U]urisdiction of the United States with respect to a vessel subject
to this chapter is not an element of the offense." 103 Reinforcing the
jurisdictional role of statelessness in the MDLEA are cases finding that the
question of whether a vessel is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
does not need to be submitted to the jury. In United States v. Tinoco, for
example, the Eleventh Circuit held that whether a ship is stateless is purely a
legal question about jurisdiction, not a factual element that needs be proven to a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 104
The DTVIA also includes a vessel's statelessness as a jurisdictional term.
A vessel's statelessness is the only basis for the United States to assert
jurisdiction: under any of the five generally recognized jurisdictional theories
or the law of the flag, Congress would lack the authority to prescribe the other
elements of the offense-operating a semi-submersible or submersible vessel
with the intent to evade detection outside of any nation's territorial sea-unless
the conduct at issue had some other connection to the United States.105
Unlike the MDLEA, however, the DTVIA also makes the operation of a
stateless vessel a key component of a substantive crime. Rather than placing
statelessness in a separate jurisdictional section like the MDLEA, the DTVIA
includes it as part of the definition of the offense. 106 Furthermore, if
102. See Bassiouni, supra note 23, at 42-43 ("When universal jurisdiction can be asserted, there
is no need for a link or nexus between the enforcing power, be it national or international, and the
conduct in question, or the perpetrator or victim's nationality. Universal jurisdiction is, as already noted,
based solely on the nature of the crime.").
103. Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. § 70504 (2006).
104. 304 F.3d 1088 (11th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Bustos-Useche, 273 F.3d 622,
626 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that whether a vessel is one subject to the jurisdiction of the United States is
a jurisdictional term rather than a factual element of the offense); United States v. Guerrero, 114 F.3d
332, 340 n.9 (1st Cir. 1997) ("United States jurisdiction over vessels is no longer an element of an
offense, but rather, a preliminary question of law for the trial judge."). But see United States v. Perlaza,
439 F.3d 1149, 1165-67 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that whether a vessel is subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States must be submitted to a jury because it turns on factual issues).
105. The Act does not require any such connection. Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act,
18 U.S.C.A. § 2285 (West 2011).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 2285(a) ("Offense.-Whoever knowingly operates, or attempts or conspires to
operate, by any means, or embarks in any submersible vessel or semi-submersible vessel that is without
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statelessness were merely a jurisdictional requirement, one would expect the
Act to apply equally to semi-submersible and submersible vessels flying the
U.S. flag, just as the MHSA and the MDLEA do. The DTVIA, in contrast,
applies only to stateless vessels, not to all vessels subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States. Likewise, a ship's valid registration with the United States or
any other state is an affirmative defense under the DTVIA,'0o indicating that
Congress considered statelessness an essential component of the crime itself.
The Eleventh Circuit failed to recognize that a vessel's statelessness plays
two roles in the DTVIA-jurisdictional and substantive-and that this
distinction is significant. As long as Congress used a vessel's statelessness
solely as a basis for the application of U.S. laws to the vessel, as in the
MDLEA, it was clear that a vessel's statelessness was serving a purely
jurisdictional role. However, once a law includes the act of using a stateless
vessel as an element of the crime it proscribes, and provides no separate basis
for jurisdiction, it raises the possibility that the law might satisfy the definition
of a universal crime: it allows that state to claim jurisdiction over the criminal
act based entirely on the nature of the act itself, with no other connection to the
state.
V. OPERATING A VESSEL WITHOUT NATIONALITY IS NOT CURRENTLY
RECOGNIZED AS SUBJECT TO UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION UNDER CUSTOMARY
OR TREATY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Even if international law clearly authorized the use of a vessel's
statelessness as a sixth basis for prescriptive jurisdiction, 1os operating a
stateless vessel would not be a universal crime. 109 By definition, at least under
customary international law, conduct becomes a universal crime because the
community of nations recognizes it as such." 0 The international community,
however, has not recognized the operation of a stateless vessel as a crime at all,
let alone as a crime subject to universal jurisdiction. Nor has a treaty
nationality and that is navigating or has navigated into, through, or from waters beyond the outer limit of
the territorial sea of a single country or a lateral limit of that country's territorial sea with an adjacent
country, with the intent to evade detection, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15
years, or both.").
107. 18 U.S.C. § 2285(e).
108. See discussion supra Section III.B.
109. A state cannot exercise universal jurisdiction absent "explicit authority" under customary
or treaty international law. See Anne H. Geraghty, Universal Jurisdiction and Drug Trafficking: A Tool
for Fighting One of the World's Most Pervasive Problems, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 371, 393 (2004).
110. See, e.g., Miriam Cohen, The Analogy Between Piracy and Human Trafficking: A
Theoretical Framework for the Application of Universal Jurisdiction, 16 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 201,
219 (2010) ("The Restatement summarizes that universal jurisdiction is a result of universal
condemnation of certain offenses as reflected in widely accepted international agreements and
resolutions of international organizations."); Jon B. Jordan, Universal Jurisdiction in a Dangerous
World: A Weapon for All Nations Against International Crime, 9 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 1, 6 (2000)
("Universal jurisdiction can be exercised over an international crime, as a matter of customary law, only
after a majority of nations have consistently followed the practice of allowing nations to exercise
jurisdiction over offenders of such crimes which they have captured."); Luz E. Nagl, Terrorism and
Universal Jurisdiction: Opening a Pandora's Box?, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 339, 357 (2011) ("Indeed,
crimes eliciting universal repudiation [as universal crimes] share certain elements: the crimes may be




Universal crimes are defined as those which are "so threatening to the
international community or so heinous in scope or degree that they offend the
interest of all humanity, [that] any state may, as humanity's agent, punish the
offender.""' While there is no authoritative list of all universal crimes,
commentators generally agree that the list includes violent human rights abuses
or crimes that would be practically impossible for any state to prosecute under
other, narrower jurisdictional principles. 112 The Restatement of Foreign
Relations, for example, lists "piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of
aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism" as
recognized universal crimes.113
Furthermore, UNCLOS lists several universal crimes relevant to the law
of the sea, including piracy, of which statelessness is not one.114 Although
Article 110 of UNCLOS grants warships a right of visit when they suspect that
a ship is without nationality, the Convention specifically authorizes the
boarding state only to verify the registration of the ships. 5 Article 110 also
applies to conduct that UNCLOS identifies as universal crimes, but these other
crimes have their own, specific sections of the Convention authorizing states to
take further action.' 16 There is no such separate article for vessels without
nationality. Some scholars and states have interpreted Article 110 as
authorizing the exercise of jurisdiction solely on the basis of a vessel's
statelessness," 7 or even as creating universal jurisdiction." 8 Others have
made a strong case, however, that Article 110 allows warships to undertake
only those measures necessary to substitute for the absent flag state in
enforcing international law, like ensuring seaworthiness and compliance with
111. Scharf, supra note 23, at 368.
112. See, e.g., Bruce Broomhall, Towards the Development of an Effective System of Universal
Jurisdiction for Crimes Under International Law, 35 NEW ENG. L. REv. 399, 401-02 (2001); Geraghty,
supra note 109, at 377-78; Jordan, supra note I10, at 31.
113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987).
114. UNCLOS, supra note 31, arts. 105, 108, 109 (listing piracy, illicit traffic in drugs, and
unauthorized broadcasting).
115. UNCLOS, supra note 31, art. 110; see also Douglas Guilfoyle, Human Rights Issues and
Non-Flag State Boarding of Suspect Ships in International Waters, in SELECTED CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 83, 83-84 (Clive R. Simmons ed., 2011) ("[E]nforcement powers are
not, however, expressly available in cases of slavery and statelessness . . . . The general position is that
authority to visit and inspect a vessel does not automatically extend to a right of arrest and
prosecution."); Patrick Sorek, Note, Jurisdiction over Drug Smuggling on the High Seas: It's a Small
World After All-United States v. Marino-Garcia, 44 U. PiTT. L. REv. 1095, 1106-07 (1983)
("[C]ustomary international law, international conventions and treatise writers agree that failure to
register and identify seagoing vessels forfeits their rights to undisturbed navigation. The need for
predictable orderliness and safety for commercial, military and pleasure craft of all nations in
international water requires this doctrine. What a state may do after asserting jurisdiction over a stateless
vessel on the high seas under international law is not so apparent.").
116. See UNCLOS, supra note 31, arts. 105, 109.
117. See, e.g., Barry A. Feinstein, The Interception of Civilian Vessels at Sea in the Fight
Against Terrorism: Legal Aspects-An Israeli View, 2 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L.197, 219 (1991); see also
Anderson, supra note 83, at 337 (discussing a similar provision on statelessness in the Convention on
the High Seas, which preceded UNCLOS).
118. See Kontorovich, supra note 54, at 1228; see also Scharf, supra note 23, at 379 (briefly
arguing that the 1958 Convention on the High Seas gives the United States universal jurisdiction over
stateless vessels).
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all relevant international regulations." 9
Not only is operating a stateless vessel generally absent from lists of
universal crimes, but even those who argue that all states can extend their
criminal laws to stateless vessels usually do not claim that using an
unregistered vessel is a universal crime. 120 Norway, for example, treats
stateless ships like its own. It does not outlaw the use of stateless ships entirely
and thereby subject them to universal jurisdiction.1 2 1 Furthermore, while
Anderson argues that the dangers posed by vessels without nationality may lead
the international community to recognize the use of unregistered vessels as a
universal crime, he does not maintain that it has done so already.12 2
VI. OPERATING A VESSEL WITHOUT NATIONALITY SHOULD NOT BE A
UNIVERSAL CRIME
The question of whether operating a vessel without nationality is a
universal crime-which this Note answers in the negative-is distinct from the
question of whether it should be. Acts should not be universal crimes if they do
not threaten the entire international community, either because they are
particularly heinous or because they are the type of crime that would be
impossible to prosecute under a more limited jurisdictional principle.123 ThiS
is because the "underlying basis for all nations to exercise universal
jurisdiction" is "[t]he reality of the danger that [universal] crimes pose on all
nations within the international community."l24 If that danger is not present,
neither is the justification for universal jurisdiction.
This Part argues that operating a stateless vessel should not be a universal
crime because (1) it does not rise to the level of heinousness or pose the same
practical challenges as currently recognized universal crimes (discussed in
Subsections VI.A. 1 and VI.A.2, respectively); and (2) treating the operation of
a vessel without nationality as a universal crime would have significant
ramifications for other areas of international law, including refugee law
(discussed in Section VI.B).
119. See Papastavridis, supra note 81, at 161-62.
120. But cf Kontorovich, supra note 54, at 1228 ("These decisions may stand for nothing more
than a sort of supplemental universal jurisdiction, allowing UJ over felonies when they are part of the
same 'case or controversy' or 'common nucleus of operative fact' as a piracy. But they could stand for a
broader proposition, that felonies can be punished aboard stateless vessels, or even more broadly, that
the Constitution allows UJ over felonies to be as broad as allowable under international law. So if
international law allows UJ over stateless vessels as part of the law of the high seas, the Define and
Punish Clause incorporates this power.").
121. Fife, supra note 81, at 302.
122. Anderson, supra note 83, at 342.
123. See Geraghty, supra note 109, at 377 ("[A]n examination of acts that are generally
accepted as universal jurisdiction crimes suggests some coherent guidelines. As a general matter, the
crime must be one of such international concern that it invokes one of the two traditional theoretical
rationales for universal jurisdiction [atrocity and practicality].").
124. Jordan, supra note I10, at 5.
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A. Operating a Vessel Without Nationality Does Not Pose the Same
Degree or Type ofHarm as Currently Recognized Universal Crimes
Universal jurisdiction rests on the premise that "every nation has an
interest in exercising jurisdiction over crimes that have been universally
condemned."1 2 5 There are two main justifications for universal jurisdiction: (1)
allowing all states to prosecute conduct that is universally condemned for its
atrocity; and (2) "provid[ing] a basis for jurisdiction when jurisdiction is
hard" 126 to demonstrate otherwise. 127 The first justification (atrocity),
currently the most significant and is based on humanitarian concerns. The
second justification (practicality) addresses the particular set of crimes that,
because of their nature, would be impossible for any one state to reach under
one of the other more limited bases of prescriptive jurisdiction. The
prototypical universal crime, piracy, is largely justified under the second of
these justifications. Practically speaking, it is difficult for any state to gain
jurisdiction over pirates because their actions occur on the high seas128 and
outside of any state's control. 129 While the operation of a stateless vessel may
seem similar to piracy in that it is practically difficult for states to address,
statelessness does not satisfy either of the theoretical grounds supporting the
application of universal jurisdiction.
Neither treaty nor customary international law should make something a
universal crime unless at least one of these two justifications (atrocity or
practicality) is present. Universal jurisdiction is an extraordinary doctrine
because it allows states to prosecute individuals for acts with no connection to
that state. 130 The exercise of universal jurisdiction, therefore, raises
sovereignty and due process concerns that the other four traditional bases for
prescriptive jurisdiction do not.131 To retain legitimacy, universal jurisdiction
125. Id. at 3.
126. Id. at 31.
127. Geraghty, supra note 109, at 377-78.
128. Christina E. Sorensen, Comment, Drug Trafficking on the High Seas: A Move Toward
Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 4 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 207, 228 (1990).
129. Colangelo, supra note 24, at 144.
130. See id at 130.
131. See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 22, at 90-93 (discussing sovereignty concerns); Gabriel
Bottini, Universal Jurisdiction After the Creation of the International Criminal Court, 36 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 503, 550-55 (2004) (noting that universal jurisdiction raises serious due process
concerns because someone could be subject to prosecution in any country with little warning and
because of the lack of agreement on which crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction); Anthony J.
Colangelo, The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 149, 158 n.26 (2006) (noting
that universal jurisdiction is contrary to the traditional sovereignty model because it allows one state to
exercise jurisdiction over conduct with no relationship to it without the permission and despite the
prescriptive legislation of the territorial state); Anthony J. Colangelo, Universal Jurisdiction as an
International "False Conflict" of Laws, 30 MiCH. J. INT'L L. 881, 902 (2009) (noting potential
sovereignty implications if universal jurisdiction is applied improperly); Zachary Mills, Does the World
Need Knights Errant To Combat Enemies of All Mankind?: Universal Jurisdiction, Connecting Links,
and Civil Liability, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1315 (2009) (discussing sovereignty concerns); Madeline
H. Morris, Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World: Conference Remarks, 35 NEw ENG. L. REV. 337,
352-54 (2001) (noting the due process concerns associated with universal jurisdiction); see also
Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REv. 1019, 1103-1109
(2011) (discussing the Fifth Amendment due process concerns associated with extraterritorial
application of U.S. laws).
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should be used sparingly and only to prosecute crimes that are either
particularly heinous or pose serious practical challenges to enforcement. As I
will argue below, exercising universal jurisdiction over the operation of
stateless ships satisfies neither of these two justifications. Therefore, using a
vessel without nationality should not be a universal crime.
1. First Justification: Atrocity
Unlike many of the universal crimes recognized under customary and
treaty international law, including crimes against humanity and genocide,
operating a stateless vessel is not necessarily heinous. The international
community may, of course, have more difficulty ensuring that stateless vessels
follow relevant laws and regulations because stateless vessels lack a flag state
responsible for enforcement and oversight. This could mean that passengers
and crewmembers in stateless vessels are more likely to be injured or to injure
others. They may also be more likely to commit crimes. However, this
possibility is hardly sufficient to place the operation of a stateless vessel in the
same category as genocide, war crimes, and torture. 13 2 The operation of a
stateless vessel does not necessarily implicate humanitarian concerns,
particularly not on a large scale. It does not, therefore, rise to the level of
heinousness that has led the international community to subject other kinds of
conduct to universal jurisdiction. If individuals are using stateless vessels for
heinous ends, like slave trading, for example, it is that heinous conduct that
nations should seek to ban,13 3 not the use of a stateless vessel itself, which is
often rightly considered a relatively minor infraction.
2. Second Justification: Practical Challenges
One could also make a pragmatic argument that universal jurisdiction is
the only practical way to address the problem posed by stateless vessels.
Although this argument may be more convincing than a justification based on
heinousness, it too ultimately fails. Like pirates, stateless vessels operate
outside of any nation's control.134 Under the law of the flag, no state is
competent to force unregistered vessels to comply with international
regulations or other laws on the high seas. Because they are not subject to the
jurisdiction of any nation, they can evade international regulations governing
seaworthiness, the protection of the environment, shipping lanes, and labor,
132. There has been some effort to determine which crimes should properly be categorized as
universal. The 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, for example,
proposed that genocide, crimes against humanity, and crimes against the United Nations should be
subject to universal jurisdiction. See GAVOUNELI, supra note 11, at 24. Similarly, the International Law
Association Committee on International Human Rights Law and Practice has found that genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture are subject to universal jurisdiction. Id. at 24-25.
133. Some scholars believe slave trading is already a universal crime. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987); Jordan, supra note 110, at 12. But see GAVOUNELI,
supra note 11, at 27-28 ("Interestingly enough and contrary to popular belief, neither slavery and slave
related practices nor drug trafficking are covered by universal jurisdiction under the Law of the Sea
Convention-or indeed under other instruments . . .
134. See discussion supra Section II.B.
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among others. They are perhaps also more likely to be engaged in criminal
behavior, like drug trafficking or human trafficking, because there is no state
responsible for controlling them.
However, unlike piracy, the operation of a stateless vessel does not need
to be a universal crime for the international community to combat this problem:
less drastic measures are both possible and likely to be effective. For example,
states could be allowed to stand in for the missing flag state in enforcing
international regulations without making statelessness itself a universal crime.
Although UNCLOS does not explicitly authorize nations to ensure that any
vessel without nationality that they encounter complies with international
standards, at least one scholar has argued that UNCLOS does allow states to do
so. 135 Furthermore, if the international community is sufficiently concerned
about unseaworthy or otherwise dangerous ships without nationality, states can
agree to allow any nation to inspect stateless ships for seaworthiness or even to
detain such ships until they validly register with a state. 136 Doing so would not
criminalize the operation of a stateless ship, but it would allow states to take
steps to prevent chaos on the high seas.
Furthermore, making the operation of a flagless ship a universal crime is
not necessary to ensure that individuals who commit crimes aboard stateless
vessels are prosecuted. In general, at least one state will be competent to
prosecute such individuals under one of the currently accepted theories of
criminal jurisdiction. If their actions rise to the level of piracy, for example,
then they have already committed a universal crime. Furthermore, the state of
any victim could prosecute them under the passive personality principle, 37
while under the territoriality principle any state could prosecute them for
effects felt within the borders of that state. 13 8 Allowing states to prosecute
individuals on board a stateless ship as long as there is some nexus to the state,
as suggested by Churchill and Lowe,139 therefore, would adequately address
this concern.
Drug smuggling may be one of the main exceptions, making it
unsurprising that the DTVIA grew out of the difficulties of prosecuting drug
traffickers. Drug smugglers are difficult to detect, and states often struggle to
prove that traffickers intended to bring the drugs to any particular country. 14 0
Nonetheless, if drug smuggling is really the problem, then perhaps the act of
smuggling drugs, and not the operation of a stateless vessel, should be subject
to universal jurisdiction. This position has already found support among some
scholars and judges.141
135. See UNCLOS, supra note 31, art. 110; see also Papastavridis, supra note 81, at 161
("Notwithstanding these judicial opinions, on a stronger legal footing seems to be the contrary assertion,
namely that, in general, the right to visit such vessels does not ipso facto entail the full extension of the
jurisdictional powers of the boarding States.").
136. See Papastavridis, supra note 81, at 161-162.
137. See Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 15, 13-15.
138. Id.
139. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 30, at 214.
140. See discussion supra Section III.A and Part IV.
141. See, e.g., Geraghty, supra note 109 (arguing that drug trafficking should be a universal
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Even the Congress that passed the DTVIA did not believe that operating a
stateless vessel itself was particularly problematic. In passing the Act, Congress
focused on the difficulties of prosecuting drug crimes, rather than on any
particular danger posed by a vessel's statelessness. To the extent that legislators
discussed statelessness, they did so to underscore the illicit nature of the vessels
at issue, rather than to argue that operating a stateless vessel is inherently
dangerous to U.S. interests. Representative Lungren, a sponsor of the bill in the
House, for example, stated:
[W]e're talking about stateless vessels that are built in the jungles of South
America. They have no legitimate use. They . . . are designed to be rapidly
scuttled. Their crews often will abandon and sink the vessels and contraband
when detected by U.S. law enforcement . . . . According to the Coast Guard,
when you scuttle a vessel and all of the evidence ends up at the bottom of the
ocean, it makes prosecution difficult, if not, in most cases, impossible.142
Similarly, Representative Cohen, the floor manager during debate in the
House, argued that the ships "are designed so that the crew members can
readily sink them within scant minutes of being spotted, thereby making it
virtually impossible for authorities to intercept illegal shipments and bring the
smugglers to justice." 4 3 Congressmen argued that these vessels could be used
to smuggle not only drugs, but also people and weapons of mass destruction.'"
These comments are strong evidence that it was other harms, rather than the
statelessness of the vessels at issue, that the DTVIA was intended to reach.
B. Making Statelessness a Universal Crime Would Have Troubling
Ramifications For Other Areas ofInternational Law
Even if making the operation of a vessel without nationality a universal
crime would address gaps in the law of the flag, doing so would have troubling
interactions with other areas of international law. In dealing with individuals
detained at sea, states must not only consider their obligations under the law of
the sea, but also under various conventions and treaties that may interact with
the law of the sea, 145 including the Refugee Convention, the Convention
Against Torture, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the
crime); Sorensen, supra note 128 (arguing that the community of nations may eventually respond to the
threat presented by international drug trafficking by subjecting it to universal jurisdiction); see also
United States v. Salcedo-Ibarra, No. 8:07-CR-49-T-27TGW, 2009 WL 1953399, at *3 (M.D. Fla. 2009)
("International drug trafficking, as proscribed by the MDLEA, is universally condemned as an offense
against the "Law of Nations" and presents a specific threat to the security and societal well-being of the
United States."); Jordan, supra note 110, at 29 n.160 (2000) (noting that some have argued that drug
smuggling should be recognized as a crime subject to universal jurisdiction).
142. 124 CONG. REC. H7239 (daily ed. July 29, 2008) (statement of Rep. Lungren).
143. Id. at H7238 (statement of Rep. Cohen).
144. Id. at H7239 (statement of Rep. Lungren); see also Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction
Act of 2008, § 101, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2285 (West 2011) ("Congress finds and declares that operating or
embarking in a submersible vessel or semi-submersible vessel without nationality and on an
international voyage is a serious international problem, facilitates transnational crime, including drug
trafficking, and terrorism, and presents a specific threat to the safety of maritime navigation and the
security of the United States.").




International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, among others.146 One
area of particular concern is refugee law.' 47
The non-refoulement principle forbids states from returning refugees to
countries where they would face persecution.148 This principle is especially
relevant to the law of the sea because many refugees seek to escape by sea.149
The relationship between the law of the sea and the law of refugees is complex.
For example, some scholars argue that the Refugee Convention has no
extraterritorial effect because it requires a refugee to arrive in a state. so A
state, therefore, could turn away any potential refugees it encountered outside
of its territorial sea. Others argue that a refugee need only be outside of his or
her country of origin for the protections to apply, meaning that anyone "in a
Protocol State Party's custody at sea may.*. . not be returned to a place where
they have a 'well-founded' fear of persecution."15 1
Making the operation of a stateless vessel a universal crime would only
complicate matters further. Article 31 of the Refugee Convention, for example,
forbids states from penalizing refugees who, "on account of their illegal entry
or presence," "enter or are present in [the state's] territory without
authorization."lS2 Treating the use of a stateless vessel as a crime could allow
states to circumvent this provision. Because many refugees are likely to arrive
on stateless vessels, states could claim that they are not punishing the refugees'
unauthorized presence, but rather their operation of a vehicle without
nationality.
Furthermore, under the Refugee Convention, states that have "serious
reasons" to believe that a would-be refugee has committed a "serious" non-
political crime do not have to grant that person the Convention's protection. 5 3
States interpret the word "serious" differently.154 While the European Council
146. See Guilfoyle, supra note 115, at 85.
147. This Note is not an in-depth exploration of refugee law. It seeks only to highlight one
potential area in which classifying the operation of a vessel without nationality as a universal crime
could intersect in troubling ways with other areas of international law.
148. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 113 (stating that no party can "expel, return
('refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that
he would be in danger of being subjected to torture"); Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
art. 3, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; Scott M. Martin, Non-Refoulement of Refugees: United States
Compliance with International Obligations, 7 IMMIGR. & NAT'LITY L. REV. 650, 650-51 (1983).
149. See Jon L. Jacobson, At-Sea Interception ofAlien Migrants: International Law Issues, 28
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 811, 811 (1992).
150. See, e.g., J.C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 301
(2005); Barbara Miltner, Irregular Maritime Migration: Refugee Protection Issues in Rescue and
Interception, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 75, 93-94 (2006) (describing different points of view).
151. Guilfoyle, supra note 115, at 86; see also Miltner, supra note 150, at 93-94, 103
(discussing the scope of the non-refoulement requirement).
152. Guilfoyle, supra note 115, at 103.
153. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 148, art. 1(F).
154. Protection Policy and Legal Advice Section, Department of International Protection,
Background Note on the Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article IF of the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 15 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 502, 514 (2003); see also European Council
on Refugees and Exiles, Position on Exclusion from Refugee Status, 16 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 257, 268
(2004) (stating that State practice has had "little consistency" in determining which crimes qualify as
"serious").
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on Refugees and Exiles, an alliance of seventy organizations founded to help
refugees,15 5 has recommended that serious crimes "usually involve crimes
against physical integrity, life and liberty such as murder or robbery,"056 some
states instead consider formal criteria like the length of a potential sentence. 57
Universal crimes, however, could plausibly be characterized as serious by
definition. As discussed above, acts become subject to universal jurisdiction
because they are of universal concern, and the international community
probably would not authorize the use of such an "extraordinary"' 58 doctrine for
minor offenses. Because many refugees who travel by sea do so in stateless
vessels, making the use of a vessel without nationality a universal crime could
transform a large number of refugees who have done nothing more than flee
their country of origin into criminals. If the operation of a stateless vessel were
to become a universal crime, then, under the Convention, states may believe
that they can reject such refugees under the convention.' 5 9
VII. REASONS FOR CONCERN
The United States has not yet gone all the way towards treating the
operation of a stateless vessel as if it were a universal crime. Because the
DTVIA includes other significant elements, one could argue that it does not
make the operation of a stateless vessel a crime in and of itself, let alone a
universal crime, even if it does blur the line between treating the operation of a
stateless vessel like a universal crime and using a vessel's statelessness as a
basis for jurisdiction.160 Nonetheless, in blurring the line between using a
155. EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES, http://www.ecre.org/about/this-is-ecre/in-
a-nutshell.html (last visited May 4, 2012).
156. European Council on Refugees and Exiles, supra note 154, at 268.
157. Id.
158. Jordan, supra note 110, at 1.
159. It is important to note that the exclusionary provisions of Article 1 (F)(b) only apply to
serious crimes committed "outside the country of refuge." Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, supra note 148, art. 1(F)(b). Therefore, it would be much less problematic if states
criminalized the operation of a stateless vessel but could only exercise jurisdiction on one of the four
other theories, since in that case the individual using the stateless vessel would either have to be the
state's own citizen, in which case the individual would probably not be a refugee, or else within a state's
territory, in which case the exception would not apply.
160. One could argue that the presence of other elements in the DTVIA means that it poses no
danger of making the operation of a stateless vessel a universal crime. On this account, Congress is
criminalizing multiple elements of a crime in combination-the operation of a stateless and submersible
vessel, with the intent to evade detection, outside of any one state's territorial sea-which are unlikely to
be innocent when found together. To be sure, this does not mean that Congress will ever criminalize the
operation of a stateless vessel alone. An analogous scenario, for example, would be if Congress wanted
to pass a law targeting people who attempted to send anthrax through the mail. Assume that Congress
knows that people sending anthrax always use a particular kind of envelope and do not include a return
address. Congress, therefore, decides to criminalize the act of using the mail to send that particular kind
of envelope with no return address. One might argue that mailing the particular kind of envelope would
be analogous to operating a submersible, and the lack of a return address would be analogous to the
intent to evade detection. Although Congress might criminalize both elements together, this is not
equivalent to criminalizing either element on its own.
However, the difference between the anthrax example and the DTVIA is that in the example
there would be little incentive for Congress to criminalize a single element of the crime on its own-say,
sending an envelope without a return address. Doing so would be a disproportional means of achieving
the end of preventing the mailing of anthrax, and it would be an unnecessarily costly rule to enforce. By
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vessel's statelessness as a means of obtaining prescriptive jurisdiction, and
treating the operation of a stateless vessel as if it were a universal crime, the
DTVIA opens the door to troubling expansion of the criminalization of the
operation of stateless vessels. Other states may build on what the United States
has started by passing laws that, unlike the DTVIA, do not have meaningful
additional elements. If enough states do so with stateless vessels, the treatment
of the operation of a stateless vessel as a universal crime could become
customary international law. Conduct becomes a universal crime under
customary international law because states gradually treat it as such or enter
into a multilateral convention treating it as such. This prospect is particularly
worrying given the rate at which states' claims of universal jurisdiction have
been increasing.16 1 Furthermore, if operating a stateless vessel were to become
a universal crime, the potential harm would be significant.
In this Part, I demonstrate why the DTVIA should put courts, legislators,
and scholars on notice that they need to pay close attention to states' laws
dealing with stateless vessels to ensure that such laws do not effectively treat
the operation of a stateless vessel like a universal crime. In Section VII.A, I
show why stateless vessels' association with illicit conduct gives states an
incentive to pass increasingly broad laws targeting stateless vessels; in Section
VII.B, I explain why other states may copy the United States' actions in this
area.
A. Stateless Vessels'Association with Illicit Conduct Incentivizes
States To Pass Broad Laws
Stateless vessels are often, but not always, associated with illicit conduct,
like drug trafficking and terrorism, that states view as dangerous. States
therefore have an incentive to pass broad laws targeting stateless vessels to ease
prosecution for the associated crimes. William Stuntz, for example, has argued
that legislatures will often criminalize the indicia of criminality when the actual
conduct that legislators want to target is difficult to prove:
[A] given crime is defined by elements ABC; A and B are easy to prove, but C
is much harder. Criminalizing AB, with the understanding that prosecutors will
determine for themselves whether C is satisfied, raises the odds of conviction
and reduces enforcement costs. The same result holds if the legislature creates
new crime DEF, where those elements tend to follow ABC but are easier to
establish in court. Or if the legislature creates new crimes ABD, ABE, and ABF,
contrast, as will be discussed infra, members of the international community do have an incentive to
isolate a single element of the DTVIA-the operation of a stateless vessel-and to treat it as a
standalone universal crime. Thus, although neither the hypothetical Act banning anthrax in the mail nor
the DTVIA criminalizes single elements of a multi-element crime, the DTVIA applies to a situation in
which the state has an incentive to do so.
161. See REYDAMS, supra note 25, at I (noting that since 1994 "judicial authorities in almost a
dozen countries have investigated and sometimes convicted non-nationals for crimes committed abroad
against non-nationals" and that "[m]ore cases of 'universal jurisdiction' have been reported in the past
decade [ending in 2003] than throughout the whole history of modem international law"). Reydams
argues that the creation of ad hoc international tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to
investigate human rights abuses formed the "catalyst" for increasing use of universal jurisdiction. Id. at
221. A few noteworthy (and controversial) cases include the Pinochet case and the Sharon case. Id at
225-26.
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again assuming elements D, E, and F correlate with ABC.162
This is exactly what happened with the passage of the DTVIA and the
MDLEA before it. When prosecuting suspected drug traffickers for attempting
to transport drugs into the United States became too difficult, Congress passed
a law criminalizing the possession of drugs with intent to distribute by any
individual on board a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction, regardless of where the
drugs were headed.163 Similarly, when prosecuting drug traffickers for any
kind of drug trafficking became difficult, Congress criminalized the use of a
submarine without nationality outside of any one state's territorial sea and with
the intent to evade detection.'6 If the submarine requirement ever becomes
difficult to prove, Congress could drop it also. Furthermore, Congress might
also drop the submarine requirement if drug traffickers begin using many
different types of stateless ships. Stateless vessels would still be associated with
illicit conduct, but submarines would no longer be a good enough proxy.
Congress, therefore, could target all stateless vessels, relying on prosecutors to
prosecute only those individuals whom they would otherwise prosecute for
drug trafficking. Similar changes in technology have already motivated some of
the changes in U.S. drug laws, with the DTVIA responding to the increasing
use of submarines.165
Legislators also broaden laws developed for a specific context when they
seek to apply those laws to new contexts. 66 This possibility has two
implications for the DTVIA. First, the context of drug trafficking itself is likely
to change. As discussed supra, drug trafficking has grown greatly in scope and
sophistication since the 1970s, and the United States has passed increasingly
broader laws to deal with it.167 Second, although the DTVIA was written to
respond to drug trafficking, Congress may wish to target stateless vessels to
combat other dangerous behaviors. When debating the DTVIA's passage,
lawmakers stressed that stateless vessels could also be used by terrorists or
illegal immigrants. Representative Lungren, for example, argued that
"[a]lthough these new vessels are being used to evade detection and
prosecution for drug trafficking, . . . [t]he potential that someone might seek to
transport a weapon of mass destruction into the United States is further reason
for concern and why we need an aggressive response,"l 68 and Representative
162. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505, 531
(2001).
163. See discussion supra Part Ill.
164. See discussion supra Section IV.A.
165. See discussion supra Parts III-IV.
166. For example, after September 11th, 2001, terrorism laws in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and India "have been repurposed from one legislative context to another and broadened in
application." Sudha Setty, What's in a Name? How Nations Define Terrorism Ten Years After 9/11, 38
U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2011). In the United States, for example, the Patriot Act imported the definition
of terrorism from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. Id. at 26. FISA was narrowly
limited to intelligence gathering and specifically not to be used for criminal prosecution. The Patriot
Act, however, adopted the definition for just that purpose. Id. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, a law
specifically designed for fight the separatists in North Ireland was dramatically expanded to fight a new
kind of terrorism after September 1 Ith. Id at 32.
167. See discussion supra Parts III-IV.
168. 124 CONG. REc. H7239 (daily ed. July 29, 2008) (statement of Rep. Lungren).
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Poe stressed that this possibility was no "idle threat."' 69 If there is a terrorist
incident involving stateless vessels, states will likely rush to pass new laws that
give law enforcement the tools they need to respond to the new threat, like
states did after September 11th, 2001.170 Because people are already concerned
about the possible connection between stateless vessels and terrorism, such
vessels could easily become the target of these new laws. There is therefore a
risk that Congress could implement a broader version of the DTVIA targeting
all stateless vessels to combat these other threats. This is particularly likely
since legislators believe that stateless vessels "carry[ing] the flag of no country
... have no legitimate use."' 7 1
The possibility that legislators will pass increasingly broader laws in the
context of stateless vessels is particularly significant because legislators may
not even realize that their actions are potentially problematic. They, like the
Eleventh Circuit, could fail to recognize the dual role-both jurisdictional and
substantive-that the statelessness of vessels is playing. Lawmakers, for
example, could pass a law that criminalized using a stateless vessel for more
than four hours, believing that the four-hour requirement removed the
possibility of criminalizing short-term trips that are unlikely to pose any
danger. They may believe that the law is simply using stateless vessels as a
jurisdictional hook. Like the DTVIA, this law would have an additional
element (the time requirement), but the combination of elements would not
create a unique crime beyond merely operating a stateless vessel. In this case, a
state would have implicitly treated the operation of a stateless vessel as a
universal crime, without intending to do so. Moreover, the law would still
apply to many innocent uses of stateless vessels, including uses by refugees.
B. Proliferation of Laws Targeting Stateless Vessels
In addition to states having incentives to broaden the laws they have
already passed, once some states begin passing laws targeting stateless vessels,
others are likely to follow suit. States often copy each other when one state's
legislation seems particularly advantageous. Furthermore, once one state
pushes the boundaries of international law, others are more likely to do the
same. A good example of this trend is the proliferation of straight baselines for
measuring the breadth of a state's territorial sea, contiguous zone, and
exclusive economic zone. The extent of a coastal state's control over the
adjacent waters is measured from a baseline that is normally formed by the
"low-water line along the coast."l 72 Under certain limited circumstances, states
are permitted to draw straight baselines that increase the size of their territorial
sea.'7 3 Treaty and customary international law theoretically constrain how and
169. Id. at H7240 (statement of Rep. Poe).
170. See Setty, supra note 166 (discussing how several states passed extraordinarily broad laws
in the hurried atmosphere after September 11).
171. 154 CoNG. REC. H10253 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Rep. Lungren).
172. UNCLOS, supra note 31, art. 5.
173. Id. art. 7(1).
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when states can use straight baselines. 74 While the use of straight baselines is
intended to be exceptional, however, their use has become quite common, with
many states using them in unauthorized ways. 75 Thus, one scholar has
concluded that the rules have been so abused that "it would now be possible to
draw a straight baseline along any section of coast in the world and cite an
existing straight baseline as precedent."' 7 6 The more some states use straight
baselines in impermissible ways, the more other states feel justified in doing so
as well. Thus, in the case of stateless vessels, once one state passes a law
criminalizing the operation of a stateless vessel that makes it easier for them to
prosecute individuals whom they consider dangerous, others are likely to
follow.
Furthermore, it is not unusual for states, both developing and developed,
to model their own laws after those of the United States.177 Other states,
therefore, might enact their own drug laws modeled on the DTVIA, particularly
if it proves effective in combatting drug smuggling or other perceived threats.
Furthermore, when other countries that lack the United States' legal norms of
due process and democracy enact broad laws, they can implement them in
manners and contexts that the United States never imagined. Again, the United
States' terrorism laws provide a good example. The USA PATRIOT Act of
2001 gives the U.S. government extensive powers to combat terrorism,
including authorizing domestic surveillance and freezing assets. In passing
these broad laws, Congress believes that it can rely on law enforcement
officials not to abuse the power it gives them. This can raise problems,
however, when other countries copy these laws. In adopting its own counter-
terrorism law, El Salvador adopted the U.S. model. 79 El Salvador, however,
has used the law not only to combat terrorists, but also as a tool to silence
political dissenters. 8 0
It is not difficult to see how a similar situation could occur with stateless
vessels. As discussed supra, the United States is hardly the only state to assert
jurisdiction over stateless vessels. At least England and Norway do so as
well. 18 It would not be surprising, therefore, if other states followed suit.
174. See Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116,
133 (Dec. 18); CHURCHILL & LoWE, supra note 30, at 35.
175. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 30, at 38-39.
176. Id. at 40 (quoting J. R.V. PRESCOTT, THE MARITIME POLITICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE
WORLD 38 (1985)). For more information about the growing use of straight baselines, see generally
Gayl S. Westerman & Michael Reisman, Straight Baselines in International Law: A Call for
Reconsideration, 82 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 260 (1988).
177. See, e.g., Stuart R. Cohn, Teaching in a Developing Country: Mistakes Made and Lessons
Learned in Uganda, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 101, 101 (1998); George Stephanov Georgieve, Contagious
Efficiency: The Growing Reliance on U.S.-Style Antitrust Settlements in EU Law, 2007 UTAH L. REv.
971 (2007); Julia M. Metzger & Samuel L. Bufford, Exporting United States Bankruptcy Law: The
Hungarian Experience, 21 CAL. BANKR. J. 153 (1993).
178. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)
(codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
179. See Mirna Cardona, Note, El Salvador: Repression in the Name of Anti-Terrorism, 42
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 129, 130-31 (2009).
180. Id. at 131.
181. See discussion supra Section III.B. Italy does so as well. See Papastavridis, supra note 81,
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Although one might argue that there is only a small probability that enough
states will criminalize the operation of a stateless vessel for it to become
customary international law, the magnitude of the harm that could result
justifies taking steps now to ensure that it does not come about. These potential
harms include the troubling interactions that such a legal development would
have with refugee law, potentially removing international protections from a
population that is already highly vulnerable.' 8 2
VIII. CONCLUSION
The DTVIA represents a potentially dangerous, although perhaps
unwitting, step towards making the operation of a stateless vessel a universal
crime. When hearing challenges to the DTVIA and any future law, therefore,
U.S. courts should be careful to interpret Congress's ambiguous actions
narrowly, in a way that does not result in the exercise of universal jurisdiction
over the standalone act of operating a stateless vessel. If courts do not realize
that the statelessness of the vessels is not playing merely a jurisdictional role,
however, they may give ambiguous laws a dangerously broad interpretation.
The Eleventh Circuit, therefore, should not have considered the DTVIA simply
as a new application of the jurisdictional principles embodied in the MDLEA
and earlier drug laws. Courts need to engage in careful analysis of laws that
blur the line between using a vessel's statelessness as a basis for jurisdiction
and making the operation of a stateless vessel a universal crime, adopting
interpretations that do the former, and not the latter, whenever possible.
Moreover, in drafting laws applying to stateless vessels, legislators should
be careful that they do not go too far, believing that they are simply using
stateless vessels for jurisdictional purposes when they are actually acting as if
they could make the operation of stateless vessels a universal crime. Lastly,
international law scholars should be aware of the problem, so that they can
identify instances where states have gone too far. Only by carefully imposing
limits on the acceptable treatment of stateless vessels can the international
community ensure that states do not act as if they can subject stateless vessels
to universal jurisdiction. While vessels without nationality do threaten the
public order on the high seas, making the operation of such vessels a universal
crime is not the solution.
at 160-61.
182. See discussion supra Part VI.
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